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ABSTRACT
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession that
ensued had reverberations that were not only social, political and
economic. The crises also led to increased doubt in the value and
usefulness of policy expertise and in its producers. This ‘epistemic
crisis’ is the starting point of this thematic issue dedicated to think
tanks in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis and Great
Recession. The Introduction to the issue has four objectives. First,
it gives a high-level overview of the challenges and opportunities
think tanks have faced in the wake of these crises, given the
paradox of growing demand for policy expertise precisely at the
moment when such expertise and its makers became suspect for
many. Second, the Introduction gives an overview of the research
literature on think tanks and their role in the policy-making pro-
cess and the public debate. Third, the articles comprising this
thematic issue are introduced, and connections between them
established. Fourth, the introduction gauges the eﬀects of Global
Financial Crisis and Great Recession, but also crises more generally,
on think tanks and the environment they operate in, and spec-
ulates about the future of the think tank industry.
KEYWORDS





● Think tanks have become ubiquitous actors in the global production of policy
knowledge.
● The Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession prompted a surge in doubt over
the capacity of policy experts, including those at think tanks, to oﬀer eﬀective
policy advice.
● Although think tanks remain pivotal actors at the interface of expertise and policy,
they face growing institutional challenges and competition.
Introduction
Over the last half century, questions over the relationship between policy ideas, policy
outcomes, and the ‘politics of expertise’ have inspired a rich literature across the social
sciences. The Global Financial Crisis of 2007/08, followed by the Great Recession, have
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given renewed urgency to a discussion of how policy, politics and knowledge interrelate.
This is so because the crises have also led to an ‘epistemic crisis’: a moment when
knowledge of the social world becomes unsettled and the authority of experts contested.
This crisis of expert authority is evidenced by a growing distrust in those professionally
responsible for creating the knowledge that underpins public policy. However, at the
same time, ‘experts’ and ‘technocrats’ were and are expected, by the public and political
decision-makers, to provide ideas to end the crisis and to ensure it ‘never happens again’.
This thematic issue addresses the role of expertise and ‘ideas organisations’ in
policy-making and in discourse construction during the Global Financial Crisis and
Great Recession with an emphasis on policy knowledge as produced, re-packaged,
synthesised and disseminated by think tanks. The crisis is treated as a ‘critical
juncture’ – understood as a test of the ability of think tanks to adapt to new
circumstances, as well as of their capacity to utilise these extraordinary conditions
to claim their social necessity and political utility. This focus was chosen chieﬂy for
two reasons. The ﬁrst is the societal importance of both the Global Financial Crisis
and Great Recession, as they have damaged the economies and social fabric of many
countries and have long-term consequences for the well-being of millions.
Accordingly, it is worth considering on what kind of knowledge-basis the policy
responses to these crises have been formulated and what kind of knowledge has
contributed to policy decisions.
Taking think tanks seriously as relevant policy actors – besides other policy advice
organisations such as lobby ﬁrms, academic institutes and pressure groups – is justiﬁed
in at least three respects. First, in many countries, the think tank cosmos has reached
critical mass in terms of their sheer numbers. Indeed, many think tanks have attained
organisational maturity and ﬁnancial sustainability, as well as a permanent presence in
the public debate. In other words, the think tank ‘industry’ has consolidated
globally. Second, think tanks are organisations established with the explicit mission of
informing government policy, either directly or indirectly. This is an ambition to be
scrutinised in what is an increasingly crowded and competitive arena of policy analysis
and policy entrepreneurship. Third, in a world of complex and interdependent pro-
blems, think tanks have been trying to establish themselves as indispensable repositories
of expertise, technical skill, professional experience, rational thinking and policy opi-
nion, providing solutions for politicians and civil servants, and content for the media.
While the study of think tanks provides a vantage point from which to appraise these
link between politics, policy and ideas, it also presents an opportunity to examine the
calibre and capacities of these organisations.
The reader will ﬁnd in this issue articles discussing think tanks in various
geographical and political settings and using often very diﬀerent methodologies.
The connective tissue between all articles is the focus on either (broadly deﬁned)
economic policy – where they take a speciﬁc focus on trade, ﬁscal, ﬁnancial or
monetary policy – or on the role of think tanks in the generation of, and opposition
to, the politics of austerity and its accompanying neoliberal discourses. The thematic
issue assembles articles which approach the core questions through either national,
comparative or transnational lenses. Three articles have a transnational theme in that
they analyse the role of Asian think tanks in Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) regional economic integration, philanthropic funding of think tanks in the
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post-Soviet space, and the transnational nature of think tank networks in Europe. A
set of four articles focusses on national arenas of policy-making and think tank
activity by looking at Brazil, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of
America (USA).
The Introduction continues as follows. First, the historical and institutional context
of the Global Financial Crisis and the ensuing Great Recession are outlined from the
perspective of those professionals tasked to provide expert advice on how to ‘deal’ with
the crises. Second, an overview of how think tanks are discussed in the research
literature is followed by a synopsis of the articles contained in this thematic issue.
The third and ﬁnal section asks ‘Wither the think tank?’.
The Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession
The near-collapse of the global ﬁnancial system after the 2007/08 Global Financial
Crisis and the subsequent Great Recession had far-reaching eﬀects on both developed
and developing countries. Ten years after the crisis erupted, the consequences can still
be felt. From the point of view of those tasked with providing policy advice, three
crucial questions urgently warranted an answer in the immediate aftermath: (a) what
were the causes of these crises; (b) what would appropriate policy responses look like;
(c) who should be trusted to provide solutions after the failure of many experts to
predict the ﬁnancial collapse, issue warnings, or propose policies to avert it.
The most common account of the Global Financial Crisis is that after sustained
losses in the housing sector in the USA, the debt write-oﬀ of Bear-Stearns, the
nationalisation of Northern Rock bank in Britain in 2007 and the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, global ﬁnancial markets entered a period of
turmoil (Guillén, 2009) which aﬀected ﬁnancial institutions across the world. These
circumstances prompted many governments to bail out ‘too-big-to-fail’ banks while the
global economy started to take a downturn. The bail out response, coupled with
reduced tax receipts due to the emerging economic crisis, transformed a crisis of the
private ﬁnance industry into a crisis of public deﬁcit which, in turn, led to massive
public spending cuts in many countries (Gamble, 2009; Thompson, 2012) which
deepened the recession.
Since these events, a rich economics literature has emerged seeking to analyse what
caused these events (see Lo, 2011). Some authors blame the lack of regulatory oversight
over ﬁnancial ‘innovations’ such as derivatives. Others claim that throughout the 1980s,
the US-American Federal Reserve Bank’s low interest rates created the conditions for a
credit bubble. Beyond diﬀering diagnoses of this crisis, much of the debate has centred
on the uncertainty over the sustainability of the capitalist economic order and, more
speciﬁcally, its eﬀects on global inequalities (e.g. Piketty, 2014). Not since the end of the
Cold War, have such doubts been voiced as clearly and loudly as now (e.g. Streeck,
2014).
In parallel to competing narratives framing the causes of the Global Financial Crisis,
diﬀerent discourses on ‘what is to be done’ emerged in its wake. This concerns
the second question, the debate about appropriate policy responses. The most immedi-
ate and pervasive reaction to the crisis consisted of the re-capitalisation of struggling
banks. It was globally adopted and coordinated, and drastically impacted liquidity,
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demand, employment and tax revenue in North America and Europe. These ‘bailouts’
plunged the ﬁscal situation and economic growth prospects of many countries into
reverse, thus leading to the Great Recession and setting in motion changes in a wide
range of policy sectors. After a short revival of Keynesianism in the wake of the
agreements of the G20 meeting in 2008, amongst such changes were a sharp contraction
of public spending in Europe, particularly through cutting welfare expenditure after the
spring of 2010. In the USA, the Global Financial Crisis led to, ﬁrst, a stimulus package
that sought to launch an economic recovery and, second, the ever more common use of
‘quantitative easing’ as a monetary policy tool.
The repercussions of the near-collapse of the ﬁnancial order in the US and Europe
were also felt elsewhere. In the early stages of the Global Financial Crisis, many
developing world economies continued to grow, if sometimes beset by growing trade
imbalances and market volatility. However, in many instances, this relative calm did not
last (United Nations, 2015). For example, in commodity-dependent countries such as
Brazil, an export boom fuelled by Chinese demand gave way to economic crisis and
subsequent austerity measures. Meanwhile, across the rising economies of Asia, the
instability of the global economy generated new pressures for policy planning and
coordination, most notably in China and in ASEAN member countries. Such develop-
ments meant that, in terms of policy advisory opportunities, the Global Financial Crisis
opened opportunities to press for policy change and encouraged attempts to foster
international and regional cooperation and policy coordination requiring policy exper-
tise (Álvarez-Rivadulla, Markoﬀ, & Montecinos, 2010).
Perhaps the most prevalent policy response to the ﬁnancial crisis has been public
deﬁcit reduction to tackle supposed government ‘proﬂigacy’. In both discursive terms
and public spending outcomes, arguments for the need for ﬁscal restraint quickly
gained hegemony over the short-lived revival of Keynesian stimulus spending. In
other words, austerity became the ‘only game in town’, certainly in much of Europe,
as the supposedly inevitable policy response to the crises. Neoliberalism, after 2010,
demonstrated its resilience; some have even argued that it has been strengthened
(Schmidt & Thatcher, 2013) by the crises. The impact of the ‘age of austerity’ has
been particularly harsh in Europe as ‘ﬁscal consolidation’ has left a deep imprint on
many countries’ public services and public investment. Even Germany, comparatively
unaﬀected by the economic crisis, reinforced its domestic austerity agenda and ensured
that austerity became even further institutionally entrenched in the Eurozone. The
academic debates over the need for continued ﬁscal stimulus and over the harmful
deﬂationary eﬀects of sharp deﬁcit reductions, voiced even by international organisa-
tions traditionally linked to the ‘Washington Consensus’ (see CFM, 2015; IMF, 2014),
did not generate much counter-hegemonic weight. In that sense, the crisis opened a
certain distance between the judgment of the majority of academic economists and the
prevailing policy responses.
This stark tension between actual policy and the advice of economists leads to the
third question: Who should be trusted for solutions after the failure of expert commu-
nities to predict or prepare for the ﬁnancial collapse? In the aftermath of the crisis, the
role of economic experts in policy-making processes and public debate has come under
increased scrutiny. This is in some contrast to the decades before the Global Financial
Crisis. Until then, many saw the economics profession as the dominant social science
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with regard to actual impact on policy (Fourcade, Ollion, & Algan, 2015; Lebaron, 2006;
Maesse, 2015); indeed, it had become common to ﬁnd economists in positions of
leadership. However, the failure of many leading economists and research institutes
to appreciate the likelihood of a large-scale crisis and the perceived distance between
their discipline and ‘real world economics’ (Lawson, 2009) tarnished their reputation
and rendered problematic their future role in policy-making. In other words, the
technocratic de-coupling of democratic politics and expertise has, since the crisis,
become ever more suspect and experts are now seen as too partial and insuﬃciently
trustworthy to defer political decisions solely to their arbitrage.
Paradoxically, this growing mistrust of expertise coincided with a moment when new
‘windows of opportunity’ (Kingdon, 2003) or ‘critical junctures’ (Schmidt, 2008)
emerged for well-positioned ‘policy entrepreneurs’ to advocate their ideas and to
increase their political relevance by legitimising a government or party’s policy choices
(Boswell, 2009). Amongst the experts and policy entrepreneurs seeking to inﬂuence
policy-makers, think tanks are particularly interesting to observe because of a number
of unique qualities. For example, while their output in the form of policy analysis and
proposals requires them to be perceived as rigorous, they are less constrained than
academics by peer-review publishing processes and the ‘scientiﬁc consensus’ within
relevant disciplines. Furthermore, they do not have the easily visible ‘stigma of self-
interest’ of, for example, an interest group or lobby ﬁrm. In addition, think tanks may
have the institutional capacity to respond swiftly to developing events so that, notwith-
standing the quality of their output, they may have a chance to set an agenda and its
tone. As the stated mission of most think tanks is to inﬂuence both the policy-making
process and the public debate, the Global Financial Crisis and ensuing recessionary
conditions have oﬀered privileged opportunities to fulﬁl this role.
Analysing think tank power and inﬂuence: a diﬃcult task
Think tanks are just one actor in the large and growing variety of organisations which
inform the policy process. They stand alongside academic institutes, management
consultancies, political foundations, pressure groups and charitable foundations that
also advocate their policy analysis and ideas. Think tanks are amongst the more
thoroughly researched actors on this list. Indeed, a diverse scholarly literature on the
think tank topic has emerged, dating back a few decades (e.g. Abelson and Carberry
1997; Beloﬀ, 1977; Blackstone & Plowden, 1988; Cockett, 1995; Desai, 1994; Goodwin &
Nacht, 1995; Quigley, 1997; Stone, 1996; Struyk, 1999; Weiss, 1992; Willetts, 1987).
Given that the contributions to this thematic issue are connected by their focus on the
role of think tanks in the making of policy responses to Global Financial Crisis and
Great Recession, the following discussion of the state-of-the-art of think tank research
covers some shared ground between the various contributions. In particular, the
question of how to deﬁne think tanks and distinguish them from other organisations
is one that occupies the authors in this volume as does the methodological problem of
how to measure think tank inﬂuence.
The focus on think tank deﬁnition and inﬂuence was chosen for two reasons. First,
because these issues have characterised the scholarship on these organisations and,
through them, one can evaluate the place and role think tanks are deemed to have in
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the policy process. Second, given the paradox of think tanks and policy experts in times
of crisis – when their advice is simultaneously in more demand and more mistrusted –
examining the ‘places’ and ‘roles’ think tanks seek for themselves can help identify the
conditions under (and conduits through) which experts can help frame policy problems
and, in turn, eﬀect policy change.
Aside from conducting empirical and critical analyses of what think tanks do, much
of the early scholarship has elaborated think tank deﬁnitions and discussed how to
measure, or at least compare, their inﬂuence on policy. Regarding the issue of deﬁni-
tions, some authors have developed typologies to understand what think tanks do and
how. One of the most inﬂuential of these was proposed by Kent Weaver, tailored to the
USA think tank landscape. Weaver distinguished between ‘academic’, ‘contract
research’ and ‘advocacy’ think tanks to highlight type-speciﬁc kinds of outputs, objec-
tives and ways of achieving them (Weaver, 1989). This typology has been adapted to
other contexts (see Císař & Hrubeš, 2016; Gellner, 1995; Haughton & Allmendinger,
2016).
However, other scholars have argued that the application of such think tank typol-
ogies can be problematic as some organisations may perform ‘think tank functions’
sometimes, but not always. In other words, the argument is that one should move from
understanding think tanks as organisations with distinct and unchangeable features
towards looking at what an organisation does in order to label it a ‘think tank’ in the
context of the policy process of interest to the researcher (Pautz, 2011). Indeed, some
have argued that the boundaries between university institutes, think tanks and con-
sultancies and their forms of knowledge production and dissemination have become
increasingly blurred (Kipping & Engwall, 2002; Weingart, 2005) and that the export of
think tanks as an organisational type has led to the emergence of hybrid forms which
resist the traditional conﬂation of function with a speciﬁc organisational format (Stone,
2013). This argument is made in a number of articles in this edition.
Another factor complicating agreement on what constitutes a ‘think tank’ has
emerged through ‘peer-review’ rankings. McGann’s widely referenced ‘Go To Think
Tank Index’ uses this technique by inviting the professional opinion of over 2500
university faculty and administrators, journalists, policy-makers, think tank scholars
and executives, and donors (McGann, 2017). Over 6846 organisations were considered
in the 2017 peer-review, with the result that Amnesty International and Transparency
International – usually thought of as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – are
counted as the eighth and ninth most inﬂuential think tanks in the world.
The ‘independence’ of think tanks is one of the factors that has been central in the
literature. Think tanks often hinge their reputation and authority on their supposed
autonomy – whether that be legal, ﬁnancial, academic or a combination thereof – from
governments, political parties, corporations or pressure groups. In other words, a think
tank without independence is in danger of being regarded as yet another member of the
lobbying community, a ‘hired gun’. Much of the discussion around the notion of
independence relates to the diversity of think tank funding sources and their ‘not-for-
proﬁt’ status in many countries (Weaver, 1989). Today, the latter characteristic of think
tanks as non-proﬁt, civil society organisations, has become diluted, as think tanks
emerge in (semi)authoritarian states, often created as state-funded entities or at least
patronised by governments. Moreover, international organisations or universities can
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take on think tank-like functions. For example, the Asian Development Bank Institute,
or the United Nations University which claims to be a think tank for the UN.
Increasingly, the traditional free-standing civil society based American or British style
think tank is being outnumbered by ‘hybrid’ policy analysis organisations.
The use of ‘independence’ as a criterion that makes or unmakes a think tank is linked
to the complex relationship between knowledge and science, on the one hand, and
politics and policy-making on the other. Traditionally, the study of the link between
politics and scientiﬁc evidence has been conducted through the lens of a presumed
‘relationship’ between two distinct spheres or ‘sub-systems’ (Caplan, 1979; Sager, 2007).
In the 1970s, the debate focused on the ‘technocratic’ model of understanding this
relationship, which stipulated the primacy of expertise over the world of politics. This
framework was later attacked by proponents of the ‘decisionist’ model, who argued that
the goals of policy should be left to political decision-makers, involving experts as only
one set of stakeholders. This debate between models that assume a mono-directional
ﬂow between ideas and policy was, many argue, resolved by the ‘pragmatist model’. The
latter is characterised by the notion of recursive dialectic exchanges between experts
and political decision-makers, between knowledge and politics, with the inclusion of the
public (Habermas, 1968; Krauch, 1970; Rudloﬀ, 2004; Weingart, 2005). Furthermore, as
many papers in this thematic issue show, the link between expert knowledge and
policy-making is never straightforward, but is in constant negotiation and, in cases
such as the Global Financial Crisis, besieged by a mistrust of available expertise.
Discussions over the policy knowledge nexus and over the remit of expert authority
in policy-making are of relevance to the debate about think tank inﬂuence, particularly
when studying them in a moment of convergence of epistemic crisis and crisis of
capitalism, such as occurred in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. After all, a
reputation for intellectual autonomy (often linked to institutional independence) can
bolster the claims of legitimacy of policy entrepreneurs who could otherwise be easily
dismissed as biased and self-interested. Indeed, perceptions of intellectual ‘indepen-
dence’ continue to be important for actors who seek to inform policy – not least for
think tanks themselves and for how they present themselves to the public, their funders
and users of their products. For example, studies on think tanks’ role in health policy
ﬁrmly question the idea that think tanks are independent but argue that they success-
fully operate via a ‘technocratic’ way of presenting themselves (Shaw, Russell, &
Greenhalgh, 2015; Smith, Thomson, & Lee, 2016).
All these attempts to grapple with think tanks, and their relationship with other
political actors, have in common that they understand these organisations as producers
of discourses that seek to inﬂuence policy-making and the ‘climate of opinion’ by
disseminating their work to an ‘eﬀective public’ (Desai, 2006) comprised of opinion
formers, civil servants, decision-makers, business people and academics. Accordingly,
aside from the question ‘What is a think tank?’ the topic of the extent of their inﬂuence
looms large (Abelson, 2009; McNutt & Marchildon, 2009; Stone, 2013).
Thus far, both think tanks and those who analyse them ﬁnd it methodologically and
empirically diﬃcult to produce convincing evidence for proving their inﬂuence or the
lack of the same. This is a general problem for political research: It is fair to say that
studying the clout of a pressure group on parliamentary legislation or even of experts
more broadly, is equally beset by methodological problems. ‘Measurement’ of inﬂuence
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is a particularly fraught aﬀair: think tank rankings (such as McGann’s GoTo guide) are
based on sets of incommensurate ‘opinions’; there is a temporal dimension in that
political impact and policy inﬂuence can look diﬀerent in the short-, medium- and
long-term; and many types of ‘inﬂuence’ are not amenable to positivist and quantitative
modes of measuring. For instance, how does one measure the value of a diverse think
tank community in a democratising country, the interactions of which may help create
a more open, participatory and pluralist policy debate to counter the inﬂuence of
powerful bureaucratic, corporate and media interests? Such qualitative and normative
considerations are not captured by metrics (Pautz, 2011).
Nevertheless, through theory development, scholars have often sought to understand
how think tanks try to exert inﬂuence on policy, what kind of ‘ideational products’ are
more likely to achieve inﬂuence, and at what point in the policy process their inﬂuence
is most palpable (see Abelson, 2009). Yet, there are also other methodologies. For
instance, Fraussen and Halpin (2016) take as their point of departure organisational
inputs and explore what resources think tanks need in order to develop inﬂuence,
arguing that high levels of research capacity, organisational autonomy and a long-term
policy horizon are required. Likewise, focusing on Washington DC think tanks, Garsten
and Sörbom (2014) suggests that these organisations have the ability to set policy
agendas contrary to the interest of other actors by ‘partially organising’ their environ-
ment – not by constructing a self-suﬃcient organisation, but rather by organising a
network around the think tank. Other authors emphasise that the media are an
important gateway towards inﬂuence (Misztal, 2012), while others ﬁnd in case-studies
the opposite to be true (Lalueza & Girona, 2016). There are also neo-Gramscian
approaches which scrutinise think tanks’ production and distribution of ideas, with
the aim of understanding the ‘materiality’ of ideas (Plehwe, Walpen, & Neunhöﬀer,
2006, p. 5; Pautz, 2012).
While assessing the relevance of a think tank or a network of think tanks for policy-
making and the policy debate is a challenging endeavour, given their growing number
and links to elites, it is neither impossible to arrive at answers nor is it futile to discuss
their inﬂuence. The next section, which provides a synopsis of the papers that comprise
the thematic edition, addresses how the contributing authors approach this issue.
The thematic issue – a synopsis
The contributions to this thematic issue have a number of common features.
Unsurprisingly, all discuss ‘inﬂuence’ in one way or another. However, they do so in
diﬀerent ways, reﬂecting the diﬃculty of assessing the role and impact of ‘ideas
organisations’. Amongst the methods are those of document analysis and interviews,
and social network analysis (SNA). While the former is ‘more traditional’, the latter is
still relatively untapped in think tank research as a useful way to map the connections
of think tanks with other organisations and the individuals associated with them.
Likewise, the sources of theoretical inspiration accounting for inﬂuence are diverse.
They include the agency-oriented frameworks that account for think tank inﬂuence via
their participation in ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas, 1989) and ‘discourse coalitions’
(Hajer, 1993). Some articles are underpinned by structure-oriented analyses of dis-
course institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008) and seek to identify ‘critical junctures’
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providing ‘windows of opportunity’ for think tanks to press home their analysis. A new
tributary of theoretical insight which ﬁnds application in contributions to the thematic
issue comes from the application of Bourdeusian ‘ﬁeld analysis’ (Medvetz, 2010).
The reader will note that the thematic edition features two articles on the British
context. This is due to several reasons. Historically, the UK has been a stronghold of
think tanks and crucial for understanding the emergence of the phenomenon in the ﬁrst
place. Second, most of the literature references British think tank development – hence
the need to posit the thematic edition against this body of work. Third, in many (but
not all) respects, the UK was a ﬁrst mover country in the wake of the Global Financial
Crisis, both with regard to the short revival of Keynesianism and the shift to severe
austerity policies. Indeed, British governments were agenda-setters internationally and
seemed driven to a larger extent by ‘austerity ideology’ than by externally imposed
pressures, such as those by the ‘Troika’, which became central for European policy
responses towards countries such as Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain during
the Euro crisis. For similar reasons, given the sheer number of American think tanks,
it is also essential to include the United States. The inclusion of Brazil, as not only a
rising middle-income country, but also as home to a growing number of think tanks,
introduces a political context that is under-developed in the existing literature.
As discussed in greater detail below, the thematic edition also oﬀers a considerable
diversity of country cases through papers that take a cross-national and comparative
focus. These papers often reveal, not unlike Campbell and Pedersen’s (2015) account of
‘knowledge regimes’, how there are persistent national diﬀerences in how policy ideas
are produced; some countries do so in contentious, politically partisan ways (such as
Brazil, the UK and USA), while others, such as those in Asia, are more cooperative and
consensus-oriented.
The thematic issue also presents the rare example of research which shines a light on
the donor perspective, outlining funding interventions in think tank development in
constant conditions of economic hardship. A further novel aspect of this thematic
edition is that half the papers are geared to transnational networking or address
regional or global policy-making, albeit in diﬀerent ways. This is an important feature,
as scholarship addressing the way think tanks are networked internationally is still in its
early days.
In the following paragraphs, the contributions to the thematic issue will be intro-
duced and their central methodological, theoretical and empirical aspects highlighted.
In his contribution, Hartwig Pautz argues that think tanks contributed to the change
in the policy stance of the oppositional British Conservative Party vis-à-vis public
spending after the eruption of the Global Financial Crisis and the onset of the Great
Recession. While he does not argue that there is a direct causal link between think tank
activity and the Conservatives’ shift away from their commitments to growing public
spending towards ‘austerity’, he claims that some think tanks were relevant actors in an
emerging ‘austerity discourse coalition’. These organisations ‘gave cover’ to the initially
cautious forays of leading Conservatives into austerity politics and published debt and
deﬁcit reduction proposals, which made those suggested by the Conservatives look
rather moderate – and thus more widely acceptable. Pautz, emphasising the role of
ideas in politics and policy, attributes the (potential) inﬂuence of think tanks on policy
discourses to the cognitive dimension of public policy and political action.
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Similarly focused on the inﬂuence of ideas in policy, Carola Westermeier employs
the concept of discourse coalition in combination with post-structural discourse theory.
Through this approach she shows how the Bank of International Settlements – the
‘bank of banks’ – was crucial in a discourse coalition which, following the Global
Financial Crisis, promoted ‘macro-prudential regulation’ for the entire ﬁnancial system,
thus shaping a ‘hegemonic articulation’. While the Bank is no think tank as such –
fortifying our point over deﬁnitional confusions and realities of hybrid forms –
Westermeier argues that it performed think tank functions in the policy area of banking
regulation. She provides evidence for her claim that the BIS had extraordinary inﬂuence
immediately after the crisis, when prevailing discourse formations on knowledge about
ﬁnancial markets were particularly vulnerable to criticism and open to change.
Also concerning policy ideas, Stella Ladi, Elena Lazarou and Juliana Hauck propose
that during the Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent period of austerity, Brazilian
think tanks increased their visibility as ‘carriers’ of ‘communicative’ and ‘coordinative’
discourse in the ﬁeld of domestic economic policy. Each discourse, when pursued by a
think tank, can be eﬀective on policy – the former via the public, the latter via direct
links with policy-makers. While stopping short of claiming inﬂuence for the four think
tanks under scrutiny, the authors argue that all enjoyed ‘increased visibility’ during the
critical juncture of the Global Financial Crisis, as well as in the following period, not
least due to the more polarised discourses they promoted.
Diane Stone and Erin Zimmerman turn to Asian think tanks and ﬁnd that they
provided valuable input for informing and articulating alternative economic narra-
tives in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, and thus helped prepare the
Asian ﬁnancial sector during the Global Financial Crisis a decade later. The crisis of
2008 created additional opportunities for Asian think tanks, allowing them to oﬀer
new policy solutions concerning ﬁnancial regulation, entrenching further the emer-
ging ‘Asian’ model of economic regionalism. With regard to the latter, the authors
argue that think tanks have exerted inﬂuence as ‘transnational actors’ and as (infor-
mally and formally) networked organisations. Here again, the neo-institutionalist
concept of ‘critical juncture’ and the notions of ‘coordinative’ and ‘communicative’
discourse are relevant. Stone and Zimmerman claim that think tanks’ coordinative
discourses during and between crises ‘inject’ ideas into the political process through
both formal ‘Track One’ relationships with government and informal ‘Track Two’
mechanisms where think tanks are amongst many contributors to the public policy
debate.
Marcos Gonzalez Hernando also understands ‘crisis’ as an important starting point
for the analysis of think tanks. However, he inverts the perspective on crisis, inﬂuence
and policy change by studying the 2008 crisis through its eﬀects on think tanks
themselves. He analyses how the crisis itself aﬀected two speciﬁc British think tanks,
in relation to their modus operandi, their research agendas, and in the kind of policy
analysis they produce. He argues that the Global Financial Crisis led to rapid changes in
the funding climate and to pressures for organisational change – and therefore to an
increased eﬀort to produce ideas considered relevant to larger publics and to decision-
makers tasked with ‘dealing with the crisis’.
Vlad Galushko and Masha Djordjevic similarly invert the focus to address the ﬁnancial
conditions which may help think tanks become inﬂuential. From a donor perspective, they
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draw insights from the experience of the Open Society Think Tank Fund in the Western
Balkans and the post-Soviet space. The authors tackle the thorny issue of how funding
regimes and funders inﬂuence think tanks’ policy research agendas and, potentially, the
nature of a country’s think tank landscape. Initially, think tanks in post-transitional
Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe were often dependent on foreign monies.
George Soros’ Think Tank Fund provided core funding to think tanks in this region but
has reduced its spending in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. However, the Fund
contributed to the emergence of what the authors call ‘hybrid organisations’, that combine
their policy research with other functions, such as monitoring and watchdog activities,
consulting, service delivery or grassroots advocacy’ thus altering the landscape of policy
advice. The authors suggest that recent funding restraints could alter the demands of
donors towards ‘more impact’ and ‘less output’.
Two contributions to this thematic issue study think tanks by focussing on networks
and think tanks roles in them. The ﬁrst, by Dieter Plehwe, Moritz Neujeﬀski and
Werner Krämer, discusses the conundrum of the resilience of neoliberalism and the
dominance of austerity throughout Europe after the crisis. Utilising SNA, they ﬁnd that
right-of-centre think tank networks have been embedded amongst a range of pro-
austerity forces operating within and across European borders, which have contributed
to the fortiﬁcation of European austerity capitalism. The authors neither quantify the
inﬂuence of think tank networks nor produce a ranking, but emphasise that they have
been eﬀective in contributing to the prevailing knowledge power structure in the
economic and social policy ﬁelds.
Alejandra Salas Porras also adopts SNA methods in her Bourdieu-inspired investiga-
tion into US-American think tanks, mapping the web of alliances and discourses around
issues such as President Obama’s stimulus package. She ﬁnds that networks of think
tankers had a leading role in, ﬁrst, originating many of the neoliberal and Keynesian
policy ideas put forward during and after the Global Financial Crisis, helping ‘trigger’ a
‘war of ideas’ in the American policy debate. Second, she ﬁnds that some think tanks
employed inﬂuential individuals who would later become oﬃcials and who sought to
implement their policy proposals in the presidential administrations of George W. Bush
and Barack Obama. This provides evidence of think tank inﬂuence via the ‘revolving
doors’ and ‘springboard’ models (Weaver, 1989) and Salas Porras identiﬁes these as the
most important mechanisms available to these organisations to shape policy.
At the time of writing, think tanks continue to be created around the world. They
exhibit a continuing rate of growth, and an ongoing capacity to attract funding that
points to their perceived political and policy utility. Accordingly, the next and con-
cluding section considers possible future scenarios of the think tank in the twenty-ﬁrst
century, as well as some trajectories for future think tank research.
Wither the think tank?
While the primary focus of this thematic issue is to provide insights into the diﬀerent
roles think tanks have played in the context of Global Financial Crisis and Great
Recession, these organisations themselves have not emerged unscathed from the crises.
This Introduction thus ends with some reﬂections on the impact of the crisis on think
tanks themselves.
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First, as the policy analysis industry expands, funding sources do not necessarily widen
in tandem. Although there is little systematic data available, anecdotal accounts suggest
that ﬁscal austerity has entailed leaner times for think tanks also. Government agencies
and ministries have less funding available to support what can sometimes be considered a
luxury – non-state sources of policy research, analysis and advice. Private sources of
funding are unlikely to make up shortfalls other than in exceptional cases and circum-
stances. The endowments of some of the world’s major philanthropic foundations have,
in many cases, also taken a hit in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis.
A second factor shaping think tank evolution is competition from other knowledge
providers. Universities have established their own applied policy research centres or
independent ‘stand-alone’ institutes. Some NGOs have developed a robust in-house
policy research capacity, as Galushko and Djordjevic show in this thematic issue.
Business associations, multinational corporations, professional bodies and trade unions
are better able than in the past to promote their policy perspectives with in-house
research units, contracting academics to do policy research, and through skilled use of
social media. Likewise, international commissions are convened to address pressing
cross-border issues delivering reports and recommendations, analysis and advice in a
similar style, format and intent to that of think tanks.
Not only is there a greater range of knowledge-brokering organisations, but indivi-
dual experts – whether university-based, employed by a think tank or working as
independent consultants – are also transﬁgured in this changed environment. No
longer are individuals as reliant on employment with intermediary organisations to
promote their work in policy-making circles. Today, the university researcher or public
intellectual can circumvent the think tank, a news magazine or an academic journal and
take their policy analysis directly to the blogosphere or social media. Information
technology makes knowledge sharing direct, fast and cheap. Hence, while the twentieth
century witnessed the rise of the think tank as an organisational form, the twenty-ﬁrst
century might presage its decline. The diversity and hybridity of policy advice have
meant that think tanks are faced with increasing competition.
Furthermore, the legitimacy of political and expert elites faces ever greater societal
scepticism after the Global Financial Crisis. This vague mistrust on expertise has had
profound eﬀects on think tanks, their work and their capacity to appeal to wider publics.
As Gonzalez Hernando has shown in his contribution to the thematic issue, the 2008 crisis
has presented challenges for think tanks that seek to reach beyond their usual audiences.
This is linked to the epistemic dimension of the Global Financial Crisis, as it undermined
the capacity of experts to command authority for their policy discourse. In the midst of that
epistemic crisis – or more speciﬁcally, the crisis of epistemic authority – it has become ever
more diﬃcult to vet policy ideas for their quality. This has contributed to the proliferation
of a ‘post-truth’ or ‘populist’ policy advice and expertise industry.
Nevertheless, policy advice is still required to justify policy decisions, and think tanks
retain some potential competitive advantages in this domain. The rapid dispersion and
proliferation of knowledge complicate the absorption of information by political and
policy actors. To put it simply, there are limits to the quantity and diversity of knowl-
edge that these actors can make sense of, in particular in states hollowed-out by
austerity and burdened by ever-higher expectations from their citizens. The manage-
ment of the supply of evidence and policy analysis from research-based NGOs,
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universities and advocacy groups thus becomes a problem of governance (Thompson,
Savage, & Lingard, 2015). This governance challenge potentially demarcates a space for
the reinvention of the think tank. In a knowledge society characterised by an overload
of information and ‘post-truth politics’, there is a need for talented editors and skilled
curators, organisations as much as individuals, to help policy-makers discern the
reliability and usefulness of analytic products from disparate sources. As a class of
policy analysis organisations, think tanks can thus potentially transform into signiﬁcant
standard-setters and arbiters of twenty-ﬁrst century policy research and analysis.
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